Having worked with civil servants for the last two years, I have learned that no discussion can be allowed to finish without agreement about the next step and who is to lead it. I cannot promise quite that, but I trust that at least the direction will be clear to those who share my thinking. I will start with the general and end with the particular. My central theme throughout will be a simple one. In all the decisions which are made in health care there is an essential element derived from the ambient culture. To lose sight of its ubiquity is simply to invite the introduction of a facile and corrupted version as a substitute.
THE MEANING AND RELEVANCE OF CULTURE One of the curious features about the word 'culture' is the difference in implication when it is applied to individuals or groups. To describe a man or woman as cultured is to offer an accolade. References to culture in the context of groups or societies may carry quite different implications, as shown by such phrases as 'alien culture' or 'clash of cultures'. TS Eliot in his celebrated discussion' pointed out that society contains several cultures often jealously guarded. He also warned of the consequent dangers of fragmentation. CP Snow in his equally well-known work2 introduced a specific example of these dangers to a wider audience a few years later. I shall have more to say of this. Despite these differences, the underlying implications of the word are the same, whether we use it in the singular or the plural, whether we talk about individuals or groups. It implies a social context for thinking, for making judgments and for deciding on the most appropriate course of action. If decisions are made with reference only to the immediate subculture of the decision-maker they may prove unacceptable to those who do not belong to that culture but are nevertheless affected by those decisions. This becomes more important in an open society with unprecedented powers of communication. Politicians, for instance, can ill afford even trivial asides which appear to set them apart from popular culture. No public figure is exempt from this. A courtroom comment on the need to protect one's maid-servants from the 
CULTURE AND THE POWER OF DECISIONS
If a decision only had consequences for the decision-maker, the cultural determinants of that decision might be of interest to philosophers, but certainly not to the wider population. It would be, to employ a pejorative term, academic. When that decision affects others, they correctly regard it as their right to ask, why was this done or on what grounds was this particular judgment made? Science and technology have increased the frequency and the relevance of such questions in three ways. First and foremost, the power of decisions to influence human health and happiness has been enhanced. There has also, however, been a growth in the capacity to communicate and inform (some might say misinform), thereby making decisions more open. There is a third consequent reason for greater social involvement in decision-making. As the potential to benefit from scientific advance has grown, so some of those benefits have to be denied, since resources are finite. Health is the most obvious and in some ways the most pressing of these fields of activity, but not, of course, the only one: the same dilemma confronts those responsible for transport, the environment and education. All have to address the same uncomfortable question: on what grounds did you deny this benefit to some? That question is just as relevant to the individual doctor offering treatment to a patient as it is to a policy maker developing a new clinical service. In each case, those decisions reflect cultural values just as much as they are informed by scientific evidence. Because the strength of science leads us to focus so much more upon evidence than on culture I shall pursue the latter in more detail. However, first let us go back to the nineteenth century and some origins of the present debate.
THE MEANING OF CULTURE
It was not so much the growth of science as the growth of education which led perceptive minds to discuss 'culture' in the second half of the nineteenth century. As education was offered for the first time to the wider population, a question became increasingly pressing: what was education trying to achieve? If it was offering more than training for a specific occupation or profession, there must be a more general benefit. This concept of a 'cultivated intellect' preoccupied the mind of John Henry Newman in his Idea of a University3.
My title, however, not entirely fortuitously echoes that of a contemporary work by another thinker, whose views are not dissimilar from Newman's. Matthew Arnold's classic if now slightly dated book was entitled Culture and Anarchy4.
The issues it addresses lie at the heart of our problem of health care empowered by science and harshly illuminated by public expectation.
Like Newman, Matthew Arnold was obsessed by the breadth of true culture, which extended beyond conventional learning to include not merely reading, reflection and the pursuit of true knowledge, but also the capacity to humanize learning with what he terms 'moral and social passion'. Culture was the enemy of the 'anarchy' of his title. Anarchy resulted from the pursuit of narrow political or religious ideals such as protestant fundamentalism. For Arnold, the cultured mind, by contrast, does not rely upon dogmatic belief, but allows consciousness to 'play freely and simply upon the facts before us and listening to what it tells us' to reach a conclusion based upon civilized values. I believe that that is a far summary of what is attempted every day in medical practice.
The examples cited by Arnold are mainly political. Newman adopted a broader perspective. For him the cultivated intellect formed the basis of training not only for the philosopher and the theologian but also for the lawyer or doctor. The thesis I wish to propose for the small part of social activity in which we are engaged is not dissimilar from either position. Difficult and frequently painful decisions confronting us require to be made in the light not only of knowledge but also of the social and moral values of the culture in which we live. Recognition of this central fact is essential if we are not to be led down the false path created by narrow and simplistic systems of thinking and belief. I shall now examine this perspective on decisionmaking in more detail, moving from an analysis of the culture of evidence gathering to a rehearsal of some of the implicit value judgments which inform decision-making.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND DECISION-MAKING
Concern that clinical decisions should be based upon scientific evidence is neither new nor inherently counterintuitive. The more recent concern is with making explicit the nature and strength of that evidence. This in turn is a response both to the growth of science and to the pressures upon health care which have made society, through its agencies, look much more critically at the available choices.
On any measure we choose to adopt, scientific activity and productivity have grown massively over the past few decades: I have elsewhere used the analogy of Malthusian medical research . The question of what should and should  not be funded becomes much more critical as the  proportion of eligible research which can be supported   grows less. Inevitably, those who pay the bills for medical research ask what is the putative value of a proposal. How far is it likely to address our needs? Many researchers schooled in the past when much more research could be funded are uneasy with such questions. As a result, we have seen the divergence of cultures. This has potentially serious implications.
THE TWO CULTURE
Eliot qualified Arnold's view by pointing to the existence of different cultures within a single society. This is not always beneficial. I have already alluded to CP Snow's two cultures, of humanities and science.
Let me take two case histories, both from the cardiovascular field, one illustrating imbalance in knowledge, the other incomprehension between cultures. My first example is a rather uncommon cause of a common disorder6. There is considerable uncertainty about the prevalence of primary aldosteronism amongst unselected hypertensive patients. The most commonly quoted figure is less than 0.5% but some clinicians, dating back to the time of Conn who discovered the condition, think this is an underestimate. Making the diagnosis is important for those who have the disease. Where a benign tumour is responsible, removal cures hypertension in about half the cases. A much rarer monogenetic form, glucocorticoid suppressible hyperaldosteronism, responds specifically to corticotropin suppression.
Hyperaldosteronism figures large, despite its rarity, in every medical student's list of causes of hypertension. The literature of primary aldosteronism is dominated by the biochemistry and pathology of the condition and by methods for distinguishing one form from another. The chimaeric gene responsible for glucocorticoid-suppressible hyperaldosteronism has been identified and a genetic test is available. I would not wish to underrate the knowledge which has been gained as a result of this work, knowledge which includes spin-offs in the understanding of basic biological processes: nor can I deny that the lot of the patient with primary aldosteronism has in many cases been improved. Yet, against that background of intense, state-ofthe-art biological and biochemical research, there are lacunae. Most hypertensive patients will be diagnosed in primary care. Biochemical and radiological research suggests several techniques for diagnosis. None has been tested in non-selected hypertensive populations: there are, therefore, no relevant data on sensitivity or specificity of screening methods to guide the practitioner in investigating a newly diagnosed hypertensive patient. The clinician, if he population growths. This has a major implication for 119 is familiar with the extensive literature on the condition, may ask what are the likely returns on, say, measuring the ratio of plasma aldosterone to plasma renin, which is recommended by some groups from experience in specialist referral centres6? What are the chances of false-positive or false-negative results, he may ask, and how many patients can reasonably be expected to benefit to set against the vast cost of screening large populations of hypertensives? Is this a justifiable use of limited resources, which otherwise might be used perhaps for diagnosing more undetected hypertension? The answer to the last question is almost certainly negative, but this is an intuitive judgment, not based on scientific evidence. The example of primary aldosteronism suggests a mismatch in scientific activity between basic biomedical research and operational health services research.
There is no shortage of other examples of the strange patchiness of our knowledge. Over a decade ago, Sackett pointed to the dangers of a basic science which loses touch with the realities of clinical medicine and epidemiology7. He illustrated his paper with the reported sensitivity of a screening test for gastrointestinal cancer. Initially described as excellent at 97%, this fell in subsequent reports to 72% when the test was applied in less selected populations, thereby robbing it of practical value. A diagnostic test for essential hypertension, based upon erythrocyte ion transport, underwent a similar fate8. In each case, strong laboratory science was associated with a failure to carry out careful, if routine, clinical research in appropriately characterized populations.
My second example suggests a more fundamental lack of understanding. Angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors are outstanding drugs. Initially developed for control of hypertension, they proved both effective and well tolerated. When subsequently evaluated in the treatment of heart failure, they proved to be dramatically effective. In the first such trial mortality in severe cardiac failure was reduced by 31% at the end of the first year9. Later studies confirmed these findings in milder disease, and also showed improvement in exercise tolerance and quality of life. Cardiac failure, besides carrying a very poor prognosis, is a disabling condition and expensive to manage. ACE inhibitors are therefore demonstrably cost-effective10. Few would now challenge their role in treating patients with heart failure. And yet the evidence, such as it is, supports the most pessimistic view: the majority of eligible patients in primary care do not receive this treatment. For instance, Clarke et al. identified 281 patients in Nottingham undergoing treatment of cardiac failure by their general practitioners"l and 234 of these (83%) were not receiving ACE inhibitors. A similar failure to give effective care has been demonstrated for a number of other common, life-infarction and bronchial asthma. Is this a legitimate problem for science? There are some very relevant scientific questions. How can we best identify untreated patients? What is the most cost-effective programme of care? What are the obstacles to care? How can these obstacles be overcome? What is the most effective way of delivering acceptable care that matches patients' particular needs? This is not to argue in any way that there should be any lessening of effort in understanding the mechanisms of heart failure or in designing better methods of treatment. Both basic and applied science have legitimacy in the effort to reduce morbidity and mortality from cardiac failure. Surely any strategy for scientific research should acknowledge these strands of relevant science? Perhaps so. Nevertheless, last year a special panel of the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute, led by a distinguished clinician, published a strategy for research on cardiac failurel2 that began with mechanisms of cell growth and proliferation and confined its recommendations to elucidation of biological events. Certainly clinical trials were mentioned, but only with the exhortation that they needed to incorporate more mechanistic studies to identify better markers of ventricular dysfunction.
It is not my intention to pillory one document which is only an extreme example of a widely prevalent cultural perspective. The roots of divergent cultures are deep. Flexner in defining the philosophy of the ideal medical school for his American readership early this century was quite explicit13: 'Institutions of learning and institutions of research should be devoted to the cultivation of curiosity and the less they are deflected by considerations of immediacy of application all the more likely they are not only to contribute to human welfare, but to the equally important satisfaction of intellectual interest'. Our difficulty in according appropriate status to applied medical science is worsened by a fundamental confusion which is echoed in these words of Flexner. The advocacy of men such as Arnold and Newman has justifiably led us to recognize nontargeted liberal education as a means of equipping a man or woman for life and work. The man who had cultivated his intellect according to Newman 'will not indeed be at once a lawyer or an orator or a physician, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings'. The place and value of basic science in research activity is a distinct and more recent issue which we should not confuse with the well-merited criticism of narrow professional training.
I have discussed this in some detail because the existence of two cultures of science which pay scant regard to each other's legitimacy has become a pressing problem of our time as the demand for research funds outstrips their availability. Trace back any major development in the threatening conditions such as hypertension, myocardial treatment of disease such as ACE inhibitors and the contributions of basic and applied science become immediately apparent. Both pose a major intellectual challenge: both should attract the best intellects. Imbalance of status and esteem can only generate disaster.
At this point, I move from discussion of the requirement for a broad scientific culture to the largely unsung part played by cultural values in decision-making.
INDIVIDUAL VALUES
The pragmatic clinical trial is the most high-profile and best validated source of scientific guidance for clinical decisions. Once objectives have been defined, a protocol and outcome measures are designed to meet these objectives. These may include improvement in health or prolongation of life. Let us assume that a trial shows indisputably that an intervention meets one of these objectives and, further, that resources are available for applying it. Are we justified, therefore, in automatically translating that intervention into action in the population at risk? The answer to such a question must be an unequivocal 'no'. Between the scientific information and the final decision, a judgment has to be made, informed by the values of society and of the patient who will be exposed to that intervention. These may differ from those implicit in the objectives of the trial. Further, this judgment is an individual one, informed by individual values which may differ substantially from case to case. Let me take a specific example. Patients with bronchial carcinoma were offered treatment by surgery or by a course of radiotherapy14. Although early mortality was worse as a result of postoperative complications, the five year survival after surgery was superior. Many informed patients in a carefully conducted study chose radiotherapy despite the poorer long-term outlook, in preference to the greater risk of earlier death from surgery. This was an intensely personal judgment reflecting experience, personal philosophy and an evaluation of the likelihood, nature and mode of death. Many other examples could be given. The incidence of stroke in the patient with lone atrial fibrillation has been shown in clinical trials to be substantially reduced by anticoagulation. The risks of stroke, and therefore the potential benefits of treatment, are greater in the elderly, who pose the most difficult problems in management. As Denis Pereira Gray's group, has shown, these trials are a great simplification of the real world in which most patients are confronted by the need to decide on anticoagulation'5.
The social disadvantages of regular blood tests, the need to abstain from use of valuable pain-killing drugs and the necessary warnings of the dangers of poor compliance make it a cruel decision for the elderly, immobile and somewhat confused. How many doctors have shared my hidden relief on finding that an elderly, fibrillating patient has an salvation is not offered, judgment on the balance of risk, benefit and social inconvenience is a testing one for patient and doctor alike.
My underlying hypothesis might be challenged by those who argue that our difficulty in making decisions reflects the shortcomings in scientific evidence. Surely, given objective measures of the quality of life, risks and benefits we could, using sophisticated modelling systems, select the optimal management in the light of the best available information? Some advocates of decision analysis hold this position. I would not dispute for one moment the need to obtain better relevant evidence to inform our decisions. What I would dispute is the sufficiency of that evidence for making the final decision. It ignores the central role of cultural values in opting for one form of treatment and its consequences rather than another. It ignores the intensely individual nature of these values, which cannot be expressed as a population average or reduced to a numerical abstraction. Electing for radiotherapy or declining anticoagulation has neither scientific validity nor invalidity. An understanding of the cultural milieu in which that judgment is made may help us to interpret it: indeed my first conclusion for action is that such cultural understanding is essential. Sophisticated clinieal trials and measures of costeffectiveness are necessary but not sufficient in this process.
INFORMED AUTONOMY
This leads to an inescapable conclusion. Uninformed judgment is meaningless: respect for autonomy requires a recognition of the need for relevant information and this in turn needs appreciation of the cultural milieu in which decisions are made. Let me take an example from one of the most spectacular fields of modern science.
Genetic research has made astonishing advances over the last decades. It is a science with a high public profile which results not simply from what it has achieved so far but also from what it promises to achieve in the future. And here there is a real and justifiable concern; the capacity of modern genetics to predict has at times outstripped the capacity of medicine to prevent and treat. How far that process will continue is uncertain. My own view is that the path to predicting common multifactorial diseases by genetic analysis is beset by formidable scientific obstacles-not least the likelihood that individual gene effects will be small, interactions complex, mutations many and environmental factors powerful. Whatever the truth of that belief, many uncommon but serious monogenetic diseases can now be predicted. In some cases, no preventive treatment is available; in other cases, there are interventions of uncertain benefit which carry a risk. The decision to perform a genetic test under such circumstances may involve quite serious consequences for the patient, and established contraindication to anticoagulation? Where such 121 sometimes for others. An apocryphal story is told of a woman with a family history of Huntington's disease who requested a genetic test for her two sons. The clinical geneticist asked why, since there was no treatment for the condition even if it was diagnosed at the earliest stage. Her reply horrified him. 'Because', she said, 'I can only afford to send one child to Harvard'. However distasteful such an attitude may be, at least that woman appreciated the implications of the genetic test she had asked for. This is not always so. A genetic test for familial adenomatous polyposis was introduced into the USA commercially in 1994. When the mutation in a given family is known, this test can identify affected individuals with almost 100% accuracy: where it is not, there is a high false-negative rate. By the sixth decade cancer will develop in nearly all patients affected by the disease. A survey of physicians conducting this test revealed that neither counselling nor informed consent was obtained in over 80% of cases in which it was carried out16. How many patients would have opted for the test if they had been made aware of the full implications, and how many having received a negative result enjoyed a false reassurance? To offer the opportunity of a scientifically validated test to a patient is not sufficient. The decision to be tested needs to be informed by an appreciation of all the consequences-in which the probability of life-threatening disease is intertwined with such social and cultural factors as quality of life and responsibility for dependants. Genetic screening, because of its capacity for both good and ill in the same individual, is an extreme example of a general principle.
SOCIAL VALUES
As long as the individual is, in his decision-making, guided by generally held social values, there is no need to consider social judgments separately. This is not always the case.
Major ethical issues such as euthanasia and termination of pregnancy are characterized by diversity of strongly held beliefs. We translate scientific evidence into action at our peril, if we ignore social values.
Unplanned teenage pregnancy is a cause of widespread concern in most developed countries. The Health of the Nation target is to reduce by at least 50% the rate of conception amongst the under 1 6s by the year 2000. There is much published work on the subject and a systematic review of interventions was carried out by the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination at the University of York17. The evidence, this review concluded, was that 'school-based sex education can be effective in reducing teenage pregnancy especially when linked to access to contraceptive services'. The data further suggested that programmes aimed at abstinence from sexual activity do not add to success in this schools should provide contraception for pupils-caused predictable outrage in some circles. Social ethics and evidence became hopelessly confused in a torrid public debate. Schools, the traditionalists urged, should be teaching the art of sexual refusal rather than the practice of contraception-an assertion that seemed to stand uneasily mid-way between a moral injunction and a biased examination of the available data. I shall not discuss the justification for such concerns: the contingent effects upon society of a particular educational policy may outweigh the putative beneficial reductions in teenage pregnancy. My point is that public discussion (possibly better informed) is not only legitimate but also essential before such scientific analyses are translated into advice and action. The application of social values is an essential part of that process. The religious underpinning of such values, which was self-evident in Arnold's concept of culture just as it was central to Newman's and Eliot's, has been substantially lost.
EQUITY/FAIRNESS
One specific value is widely held in Western cultures and indeed is assumed in many social policy decisions, although often featuring in the rhetoric rather than the reality. Equity in access to the law and to education is fundamental if unachievable in practice. Health care which is 'free at the point of delivery' has been a basic, explicit principle of the National Health Service since its inception, and remains so. Where there are demonstrable and growing inequalities, as there are in health, these reflect a state of affairs incompatible with a fundamental value of our culture. I shall not discuss them further because, in the main, they are not due to unequal access to care but more wide-ranging social and economic forces. I have a more limited objective, taking respect for equity as a fundamental value that can modify or even reverse judgments made on the basis of scientific evidence.
Mass screening programmes for the detection of early colonic carcinoma have been extensively evaluated. They are costly, but also save lives. Ubel et al. constructed a theoretical scenario in which two screening programmes were candidates for introduction in a public health programme which had a limited budget18. One programme could be offered to only half the population because of its cost. For the same cost, the other programme could be offered to the whole population but, nevertheless, saved fewer lives overall. Despite this, most of those questioned in a rigorous study supported the introduction of the less effective strategy with universal access. There are three important lessons to be learned from this imaginative work. First, overt discussion of values only became necessary objective. The implication of the scientific evidence that because of the constraining effect of budgetary limitations, 122 which in turn reflects the greater opportunities which modern medicine offers in relation to what can be afforded. An infinite budget in relation to what could be done would have provoked no discussion of relevant values. Likewise a health service that had less to offer in the way of effective treatment would not have concerned itself about underlying principles. This type of discussion reflects a changed reality, not a change in attitude to health or health policy per se.
Ubel's study is occasionally quoted as illustrating the tension between scientific evidence and popular perceptions. It is no such thing. It illustrates a conflict between two different value systems, one attributing primacy to equity and fairness, the other representing a utilitarian view of the greatest good for the greatest number. Neither view is in any sense 'scientifically correct': the role of science in resolving such uncomfortable dilemmas is through further advance, enabling us to avoid these dilemmas altogether and so, in a sense, setting the clock back to an age when scientific knowledge had not confronted us with such difficult decisions.
The data reported in this work also presents us with a third even more disconcerting fact. Although the majority of those who expressed an opinion favoured equity, a substantial minority of lay and professional groups adopted the utilitarian approach. Systems of value are not uniformly shared, just as the culture in which our health care system works is not a homogeneous one. A theocratic society would not have such difficulty in resolving these dilemmas.
RECOGNITION OF IMPACT UPON OTHERS
Every decision that is made bears consequences for the man or woman who makes it and for others. If he or she is ill and buys treatment, the resources spent on that treatment can no longer be spent on other activities. This presents no problems if the individual is wealthy so that available funds exceed the potential uses to which they may be put. If this is not the case, a desirable activity can no longer be afforded. There are, in other words, what the economists refer to as 'opportunity costs', which we ignore at our peril. Society is no different. As we have seen in a different context, opportunity costs were a cause of no great concern when the power of medicine was not great and choices were limited. Now, in the face of finite resources, the cost of a decision in terms of opportunities foregone becomes a more pressing issue.
Coming to terms with this fact has not been easy. It is particularly difficult for doctors whose professional responsibility from Hippocratic days has been to the patient who seeks help. What is to be done when the benefits to the individual patient would result in unacceptable cost to society in terms of opportunities lost? Maynard has outlined
We should not underestimate the degree of legitimate concern about such issues, which have become central to the practice of medicine. What is not made clear in the debate is that health economics is no different from any other relevant science in informing but not making a social decision. Indeed, the addition of information about cost to information about effectiveness usually makes the need for a value judgment even more stark. The decision to treat a high-risk elderly hypertensive patient with drugs may save society money by helping to avoid the expensive complications of uncontrolled blood pressure. At the other extreme, the cost of treating the lowest risk patient groups may present an unacceptable burden in the form of opportunity costs lost. One can argue with the figures and the assumptions underlying them, and this is frequently done to avoid an uncongenial dilemma. The relevant fact is that the costs of treatment form a continuum across the spectrum of patient risk. At some point, a line has to be drawn at which a decision is made that the cost of treatment, in terms of opportunities foregone elsewhere, outbalances the risk of the condition5.
Let us take a more specific example. The statins are an outstandingly successful product of pharmaceutical research. Their efficacy in terms of cholesterol-lowering and prevention of morbidity and mortality in patients at increased risk of ischaemic heart disease is now unchallenged20. So, how high does the risk have to be before we decide that a patient should be treated with statins? If we accept as our threshold a mortality risk of 1.5% per annum-and there is trial evidence of benefit at this level-at present prices the cost would approach that of the total drug budget of the NHS. By accepting that only higher levels of risk justify use of these drugs, we limit the total expense (which remains considerable) but at the cost of leaving untreated patients who stand to benefit, albeit marginally. Again, there is a continuous spectrum of risk and benefit and at some point the balance between the needs of the individual and the cost to society comes into equilibrium and is then reversed. That point is determined by the value society places upon the intervention in relation to the value it places upon competing needs for its resources. The individual may take a different view.
Curiously enough, that conflict between needs of the group and needs of the individual can be encapsulated within a single professional mind. Redelmeier and his coworkers presented doctors with familiar clinical scenarios2'.
They were asked, for instance, about ordering an additional expensive test for an unusual disease, or recommending a treatment with a serious risk of adverse outcome. These scenarios were presented in two formats, as case histories or as issues about which professional advice was being sought. Physicians gave more weight to personal concerns of patients when considering them as individuals and more 1 19 the tortured debate upon this issue .
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weight to criteria of effectiveness when considering them as a group. There was, the authors concluded, a difference between 'aggregate and individual perspective'. There, in a phrase is the dilemma of the professional in modern society.
ALTRUISM
In a fascinating publication, Asch and Ubel describe brief case histories in which a physician decides upon a treatment believed to be less expensive but also less effective for the patient22. In some cases, this decision consisted in selecting a slightly less effective drug or an agent with a slightly higher risk of adverse effects or a less sensitive diagnostic procedure (computed tomographic scanning versus magnetic resonance scanning, for instance). The increased marginal utility of the more expensive procedure was small and the scenario is not, therefore, fundamentally different from that I have described in the treatment of hypertension or in the use of statins. What the authors term the compromise between cost and quality is not the main issue. The major question is when are such compromises justified? A doctor who practises in a publicly funded health care system or in a non-profit-making setting may be justified in making savings when these support the cost of a service to others. The same reasoning is less persuasive when savings result in greater profits either for the doctor or for others in a commercial system. A degree of altruism by patients is a reasonable presupposition when a doctor treats a patient and balances the needs of that patient against those of others, but not when it is balanced against the need for the provider to make money. The dominance of market forces may radically alter the picture by eliminating altruism as a driving force. Altruism is a cultural value implicit in health care systems funded through general taxation. We should not underestimate it. The extent of charitable giving to medical care and research is a powerful testament to the pervasiveness of altruism in our society. Tissue donation provides another obvious example. A survey in New Zealand in 1996 found that 2 out of 5 blood donors would no longer give blood if profits were to be made from selling blood products23. Titmuss' work on the 'gift relationship' between the donor and his unknown beneficiary was a milestone in the recognition of a specific social value in health care24. The end of the internal market may lead us to restore Titmuss' classic to its proper place. I certainly hope so. It is sufficient to say, in the present context, that his evaluation of a natural world-wide experiment demonstrates two-fold harm from non-altruistic commercialized blood markets. Reliance upon a commercial market as a driving force was associated with a worse, less safe service in face of the need to enhance personal or corporate profit. The replacement of altruism with commercial motivation upon professional relationships, standards of behaviour and social cohesion which were, in the long-term, even more important. Altruism may not be a sufficient cultural value, but it is certainly a necessary one.
CULTURE AND THE INFORMED JUDGMENT
Arnold described the man of culture as one who could 'humanize knowledge' with moral and social passion. The words may seem slightly old-fashioned, but they have clear application to the problems which confront us. The need for knowledge and evidence has never been greater if our judgments are to be informed, but this cannot be dissociated from individual and social values that are just as legitimate a part of the culture of our times as the science that has generated the opportunities. There is a second part to Arnold's thesis. The 'anarchy' of his title is the result of pursuit of a narrow political or religious ideal as a solution to pressing problems. The twentieth century has witnessed more than its fair share of such systems of religious and political belief. We should beware of such short-cuts. I have described the dangers inherent in a narrow culture of science. We are not short of other examples. We hear from one side of the debate that 'good management' will solve our problems and from the other an emphasis on the need for a return to 'professional values'. The life of the 'internal market' in the quest for institutional perfection is drawing to a close. Rudolph Klein, justifiably in my view, warns us of the dangers of 'scientism' (i.e. the belief that science-based evidence can resolve all the difficulties of the health service)25. This is not to argue that effective management, professional values and relevant scientific enquiry are not important components in making the decisions which society has to make or even that the internal market has not taught us some lessons about cost and efficiency. I become alarmed when they are treated as solutions rather than tools. Evangelical adherence to them has added to the problem rather than the solution.
SYNTHESIS What conclusions emerge from the above analysis? The respective influences of cultural values and scientific evidence upon decision-making show both similarities and differences.
First, the contribution of each has to be respected and is likely to grow rather than diminish in importance. This reflects not so much a growing interest in moral philosophy or scientific research as the consequence of unprecedented pressure upon health care and finite resources. This leads to more critical questioning of decisions from all sides. The second feature of both is obvious, but needs labouring in an also imposed less measurable but more important effects academic culture which gives a high place to the analysis of biological mechanisms. The role of each is informed by relevant research. The work upon such cultural values as altruism and equity demonstrates this fact.
In other respects there are important differences. Cultural values change with time, place and circumstance. I have shown one example of this, how acceptability of rationing may be influenced by whether decisions are perceived to be commercially driven or not. Euthanasia and termination of pregnancy provide other examples of divergent cultural values both within and between societies. We cannot extrapolate scientific absolutism to the relativism of cultural values. Cross-cultural comparisons provide abundant evidence for relativism of value systems: The anthropologist Ruth Benedict, in Patterns of Culture, concluded: 'No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to his particular traditional culture '26 The fourth characteristic of social values and beliefs relevant to health is at its most obvious in free societies. This is heterogeneity. An individual's assessment of the optimal state of health may differ from that of his peers. Mobility, freedom from pain, prolonged life expectancy, preservation of faculties may all be valued differently. It could be argued that heterogeneity is also a feature of clinical trials. The critical difference is that clinical research attempts to identify the reason for such biological divergence with the ultimate objective of identifying a homogeneous group of patients who will respond uniformly.
The care of individual patients in a free society has to recognize such divergence in relevant values. But there is another factor in this equation which cannot be avoided the impact on others of undertaking care in a society with finite resources ('opportunity cost'). This leads to my first and probably most important conclusion. The value that society places upon a given intervention may differ from that placed upon it by the individuals involved, i.e. the patient and the professionals caring for him. We have seen a striking example of this where doctors' evaluation of optimal treatment differed when considering a single patient or making recommendations for a group. Society is no less guilt) of inconsistencies. Schelling presents a scenario from the United States which must strike a familiar chord with many doctors27: Let a 6-vear-old child with brown hair need thousands of (lollars for an operation that will prolong her life until Christmas and the post office wvill be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that, without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in preventable deaths not manv will drop a tear or reach for their There is a great concern about variations in health care and the ways in which this can be reduced. There is undeniably a social need to eliminate unacceptably poor levels of care. I suggest that there are two further conditions that have to be met. First, we should do all we can to reconcile social decisions about what health care should be offered and individual professional decisions. The doctor, for example, has to recognize the impact of what he does on society: likewise those responsible for policy decisions have to recognize the pressure of individual need. But when we have done as much as we can, we shall never achieve a single prescriptive system of patient care. The individual non-uniform values that determine specific patient needs must be respected. The attempt to ignore them in more tightly regulated prescriptive systems of 'managed care' in the United States has generated predictable tensions. I draw two specific conclusions. There is, first, the need for appropriate education of those who make decisions about health, whether their primary concerns are policy or the needs of the individual patient. The capacity to understand and translate that understanding into action which is consistent with cultural values demands much more than education in the relevant sciences and practical skills. We have a long way to go. For several years, to the surprise of my fellow examiners, I set a question for final year medical students that, in a modest way, tested their understanding of the needs of the society in which they hoped to work. The questions simply asked the candidate to explore an important issue of policy, such as the need to develop a strategy for dealing with a common condition when only limited resources were available. The outcome was melancholy. If they could avoid the question, however unattractive the alternatives, most students did. The ingenuity of the remaining handful was stretched into translating the question into a list of causes or treatments. Ten risk factors for ischaemic heart disease was as close as most got to the social problem presented by cardiovascular disease. We are moving painfully towards a more appropriate professional education quite distinct from professional training. Let us not forget John Henry Newman.
Education is clearly not enough. My third conclusion relates to the way in which decisions are made. The language of health care has hitherto been the language of absolutes. The 'correct' treatment has to be given; highquality' services should be planned; even (shades of the Treasury) 'value for money' should underpin policy. The sentiments are impeccable, but the language oversimplifies issues which are almost invariably ones of relative value informed by such cultural considerations as respect for equity and fairness, altruism and individual quality of life.
Who should receive statin drugs? Who should be offered a screening programme for serious disease? How appropriate cheque-books. 125 is an endpoint trial to an individual's judgment of what is a worthwhile, desirable life? Or, on a broader level, how should a health service, founded on altruism, be funded in a world where self-interest is such a powerful force?
There seem to me to be two steps in securing judgments which are in tune with the culture in which they are made. The first is recognition of the underlying values which are relevant, and of the need for these to be made explicit. I hope the examples I have used show where a crude utilitarianism fails. The second is to recognize all the legitimate perspectives in making these decisions. The relevant cultural values are those of society as a whole and not simply professional or managerial groups. The mechanisms for that wider engagement with society are emerging tentatively and all too slowly. These processes and the underlying values which they seek to embody are the subject of legitimate and necessary research in an enlightened health service.
Matthew Arnold is worth revisiting, and not simply as a voice from another time of intellectual turbulence. Confronting the social and political confusions of his time, he perceived as well as any the need to pursue not only 'the scientific passion for pure knowledge' but also 'the moral and social passion for doing good'. The language may have altered, the social and cultural environment changed, but there is surely a fundamental relevance to our predicament.
